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INTRODUCTION

On March 7, 1988, Congressman Pickle, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, announced hearings to review the civil penalties imposed on taxpayers and third persons, such as tax return preparers,
information return filers, and tax shelter promoters.' In perhaps an
unprecedented and certainly a rare cooperative effort, reports critical
of the existing penalty structure and recommendations for comprehensive changes were submitted by the Internal Revenue Service (the
Service), Treasury Department, professional groups such as the American Bar Association's Tax Section (ABA) and the American Institution

*B.A., 1961, Colgate University; LL.B, 1964, Columbia; LL.M, 1968, Georgetown University;
partner, Baker & McKenzie, New York. Author, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE. Warren
Gorham & Lamont (2d ed. 1990). This article is adapted from Saltzman & Kaplan, CIVIL TAX
PENALTIES REFORM, Warren Gorham & Lamont (1990). The author gratefully acknowledges

Kevin J. Liss for invaluable assistance to this article.
1. See Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) [hereinafter Civil Penalty Hearings 1].
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of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), and other interested organizations. 2 The result of these hearings was a more coordinated civil
penalty structure that became part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, called the Improved Penalty Administration and
3
Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT).
This article discusses the amendment of one of the civil penalties,
the penalty on tax return preparers, section 6694 of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), 4 which sets the standard of conduct for return
preparation. As will be shown below, although Congress believed it
was making the return preparer penalty stricter by replacing the
negligence standard with the standard adopted by such professional
organizations as the ABA and the AICPA,5 the professional group
standard does not impose a higher standard than the negligence standard did under prior law. The professional group standard requires the
return preparer to have sufficient support for a return position so
that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained administratively and judicially on its merits if challenged or litigated.6 Believing that this standard was a higher standard of return preparation
than the negligence standard, Congress assumed that something more
than a "reasonable basis" for a return position would be required for
a preparer to have a realistic possibility of success for a return position.
The Service evidently believes that the realistic possibility standard
is a quantitative standard. Under new regulations issued by the Service, a realistic possibility of success exists if there is at least a one in
7
three chance of succeeding on the merits in a proceeding.
Neither the legislative history nor the regulations explains how or
why the new standard requires something more than a reasonable
basis, or why the new standard should be viewed as a quantitative

2.

Id.; Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, on
Recommendations for Civil Tax Penalty Reform and H.R. 2528, 101th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989)
[hereinafter Civil Penalty Hearings III.
3. Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2388 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IMPACT].
4. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7732, 103 Stat. 2106
(1989).
5. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1396 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2866.
6. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 85-352]; TAX RETURN POSITIONS, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 1, § 7 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988) [hereinafter TAX RETURN
POSITIONS].

7. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1991).
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standard if it is supposed to be the same one adopted by the professional organizations. As we shall see, both the legislative history and
the regulations reveal some confusion about the professional group
standards and civil penalties in general. In attempting to understand
what the realistic possibility of success standard means, it is helpful
to examine the plain meaning of the new statutory language, as well
as the history of the negligence standard (which the new standard
was intended to replace) and other sanctions imposed on lawyers and
other professionals for taking frivolous positions in litigation (out of
which the new realistic possibility standard developed).
II.

BACKGROUND

Before IMPACT, a penalty was imposed on the preparer of a
taxpayer's return if a deficiency was caused by the preparer's negligent
or intentional disregard of rules and regulations." The preparer's negligence had the same meaning as the taxpayer's negligence - that is,
"the lack of due care or failing to do what a reasonable and ordinarily
prudent person would do under the circumstances." 9 A preparer could
avoid the negligence penalty"if the preparer could show a "reasonable
basis" for the return or that he had acted with "due diligence."10
In its congressional testimony, the AICPA recommended that the
return preparer penalty be amended to adopt the standards of professional conduct recommended for tax practitioners by the AICPA and
the ABA." Under this professional group standard, a tax return position would not be subject to penalty as long as the preparer has a
good faith belief that, if challenged, the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits, administratively and judicially. 12
In a remarkably frank study prepared by the Service, it recommended,
among other changes, that the penalty on return preparers be based
on the substantial authority standard that applied generally to taxpayers. 13 This standard required substantial authority for undisclosed
positions in order to avoid a penalty for large deficiencies. The Service
also recommended that Treasury Circular 230, which contains the
rules of conduct for practitioners before the Service, 14 be revised to

8.
9.
10.
(1977).
11.
12.
13.
14.

Former I.R.C. § 6694 (prior to amendment by IMPACT).
Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967).
Former Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1 (as amended in 1978), reprintedin 42 Fed. Reg. 59,968
Civil Penalty Hearings II, supra note 2, at 123.
Id.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. Treasury Circular 230 is reprinted at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1991).
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provide that a practitioner could not advise the taking of a position
unless, in the exercise of reasonable care, the practitioner concluded
that the position, if not disclosed, was supported by substantial authority, or, if the position was disclosed, it had a realistic possibility of
success if challenged.15 This recommended standard was an amalgamation of the negligence standard (reasonable care requirement), the
substantial authority standard, and the realistic possibility standard
used by the professional organizations.
IMPACT adopted the recommendation that the return preparer
penalty incorporate the realistic possibility standard of the AICPA
and the ABA in lieu of either the substantial authority standard or
the negligence standard of former section 6694.16 According to the
legislative history, the new realistic possibility of success standard
was adopted "because it generally reflects the professional conduct
standards applicable to lawyers and to certified public accountants
[CPAs].' 7 The return preparer penalty, as amended by IMPACT,
provides that if any part of an understatement of tax on a return
prepared by an income tax return preparer is attributable to an undisclosed position for which there was not a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits, and the return preparer knew (or reasonably
should have known) of such position, then the return preparer is
subject to a penalty of $250.18 The penalty is not imposed if there is
reasonable cause for the understatement and the return preparer acted
in good faith. 19
According to the House Reports, when the realistic possibility
standard replaced the negligence standard, the standard of conduct
for purposes of the penalty was raised, not lowered. "The committee
believes that this standard of behavior is stricter than present law so
will conthat negligent behavior subject to penalty under present law
' 20
standard.
new
this
under
penalty
to
subject
be
to
tinue
Recently promulgated regulations explain the Service's understanding of the realistic possibility standard as follows:
A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Civil Penalty Hearings II, supra note 2, at 38-39.
IMPACT, supra note 3, at 2402.
H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 5, at 1396.
Id.
I.R.C. § 6664 (1991).
H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 5, at 1396.
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would lead such a person to conclude that the position has
or greater, likelihood of being
approximately a one in three,
2
sustained on its merits. 1
In other words, a realistic possibility of success exists if there is at
least a 33-1/3% chance of succeeding on the merits in a proceeding.
Consequently, the Service/Treasury interpretation of the revised
penalty may be summarized as follows:
(1) The realistic possibility of success standard is a quantitative
standard (a position with less than a 50% but at least a 33-1/3% chance
of success), rather than a qualitative standard based on the conduct
of the preparer;
(2) The chances of success on the merits of a return position can
be predicted; and
(3) The standard as thus interpreted is the standard professional
organizations would apply to lawyers and to CPAs.
A. A Plain Meaning Approach
It is fair to start with the ordinary meaning of a realistic possibility
of success. A possibility is "something that may exist or happen."' A
possibility contrasts with a probability - that is, something which is
likely to happen, something which is "supported by evidence strong
enough to establish presumption but not proof."'' "Realistic" means
"facing facts, based on facts, not on ideals or illusions. ' Consequently,
a realistic possibility of success is one that is based on facts, not
imagination or false beliefs about what may happen. Note that the
ordinary meaning of a realistic possibility is qualitative; that is, the
basis for the conclusion that success may happen is dispositive.
Does this simple exercise of consulting a dictionary provide some
insight into the meaning of "a realistic possibility"? It appears so. A
return position is realistic when it is "real world as distinct from
imaginary or fantasy . .

,"

when it "reflects the realities of the

situation." A realistic possibility of success on a return position exists,
therefore, when the chance of success on the issue is based on facts
and the realities of the situation. It is a genuine real world possibility,
not one that is imaginary.

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(I) (1991).
OXFORD AmERICAN DICTIONARY 520 (2d ed. 1980).
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 1983).

See OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 559.
Id.
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Let us see how this interpretation might apply in a real world
example. Suppose a taxpayer has a return position that is based on
a single case and the literal application of a long-standing regulation.
On the one hand, some factual distinctions may be drawn between
the taxpayer's situation and the case. Assume further, that the regulation does not specifically endorse the taxpayer's position. On the
other hand, the basic facts of the taxpayer's situation genuinely correspond to the basic facts of the taxpayer's situation in the case, and the
regulations do not disapprove of the position. The Service has announced, however, a policy of looking for litigating vehicles in the
general area of the issue involved in our case because the Service
believes the case on which the taxpayer relied was wrongly decided.
Can we say that a position is realistic if it will provoke litigation by
the Service?
The answer under a plain meaning approach would be in the affirmative. The possibility of success is realistic in this situation because
it is fact-based. The facts of the supporting case and the generally
supportive regulation provide the basis for our position. Furthermore,
the common law principle of stare decisis supports our position. A
Service litigating position reflected in a notice, or for that matter in
a revenue ruling, would not change the factual basis for the position.
Accordingly, under a plain meaning approach, the return position
would have a realistic possibility of success.
B.

The Tort Law Negligence Standard

Before the amendment of section 6694 in 1989, return preparers
could be penalized for negligence. 26 The negligence penalty applied if
a taxpayer's understatement of tax was attributable to the return
preparer's negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.27 Regulations provided that preparers would not be considered
to have acted negligently or to have intentionally disregarded a rule
or regulation if they exercised "due diligence," and where a rule or
regulation was not followed, if they acted "in good faith and with
reasonable basis. .".. -29 "Negligence," "due diligence," and "reasonable
basis" are tort law concepts. Despite the suggestion in the House
Report, the amendment. of section 6694 did not eliminate the tort law

26.
27.
28.
29.

Former I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1).
Id.
Former Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a), reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg. 59,968 (1977).
Id.
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concepts from the meaning or the operation of the realistic possibility
standard.
First, since a "realistic possibility" standard is an objective standard, it is similar to the reasonable person standard in tort law, which
is also an objective standard. Second, even under the amended penalty,
the preparer is subject to penalty if he knew "or reasonably should
have known" that the return position did not have a realistic possibility
of being sustained on the merits.30 This reasonable knowledge requirement is another way of injecting the reasonable person standard of
tort law into the realistic possibility standard. Finally, if the preparer
has taken an unrealistic and undisclosed position, the penalty still will
not be imposed if the preparer can show some "reasonable cause" for
taking the return position, 31again a tort law concept. Thus, the realistic
possibility standard has tort law aspects and must be seen in that
context.
In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, negligence is defined as
"conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. 3 2 But conduct
is not negligent unless the magnitude of the risk involved so outweighs
its societal utility as to make the risk unreasonable. As the Restatement says:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize
as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude
as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the
act or of the particular manner in which it is done.3
Thus, the actor must recognize the unreasonable character of a risk
if a reasonable person would recognize the risk. This standard is an
objective or societal standard. As Professors Prosser and Keeton have
said:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform
standard of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations
which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in
advance for all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that
can be done is to devise something in the nature of a formula,

30.
31.
32.
33.

See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (1991).
See id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 282 (1965).

Id. § 291.
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the application of which in each particular case must be left
to the jury, or to the court. The standard of conduct which
the community demands must be an external and objective
one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of
the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the
same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites.
At the same time, it must make proper allowance for the
risk apparent to the actor, for his capacity to meet it, and
for the circumstances under which he must act.3
However, even an objective standard is not meant to present an
opportunity for second-guessing or evaluating the actor's conduct with
the benefit of hindsight. The idea of risk in this context necessarily
involves a recognizable danger, based upon some knowledge of the
existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly
follow. Risk, for this purpose, may then be defined as a danger which
is apparent, or should be apparent, to one in the position of the actor.
The actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the possibilities
apparent to him at the time, and not by looking backward "with the
wisdom born of the event." The standard is one of conduct, rather
than of consequences. It is not enough that everyone can see now
that the risk was great, if it was not apparent when the conduct
occurred.3
In tort law, if the risk is an appreciable one and the possible
consequences are serious, the question is not one of mathematical
probability alone. "As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the
apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to
generate a duty of precaution. ' . 6 Weighed against the risk of harm is
the utility of the conduct in question.
These general principles of tort law provide some guidance in interpreting the realistic possibility of success standard. The tax law recognizes the social utility of the professional return preparers, who
provide valuable assistance to taxpayers in complying with complicated tax rules. On the other hand, there is also a recognized risk of
harm when return preparers prepare and file returns containing an
indefensible position, because return preparers prepare many returns,
and relatively few will ever be audited. It is safe to say that Congress
believes the harm of unsupported or indefensible return positions is

34. W. PAGE KEETON
173-74 (5th ed. 1984).
35. Id. § 31, at 170.
36. Id. at 171.

ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
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sufficiently grave that it warrants a special civil penalty. 37 Consequently, there is a correspondingly greater duty of precaution on
the part of the return preparer.
The realistic possibility of success standard, therefore, recognizes
this imbalance between the utility of providing professional advice and
the risk posed by indefensible positions. But what is the nature of
the standard? Is it one of conduct or of consequences? For tort purposes, an unrealistic possibility of being sustained exists when the
adviser knows or reasonably should know that the return position is
unwarranted or indefensible as a matter of law. The standard is an
objective, external, and uniform standard. The individual judgment
of the preparer is not the issue. Rather, the standard focuses on the
preparer's conduct in reaching a judgment. At the same time, the
standard takes into account the circumstances under which the preparer must act. The conduct of the preparer in concluding that the
position was realistic must be judged at the time the preparer acted,
not at a later time looking backward. It is not enough that everyone
can see after an appeals conference or a Tax Court case that the risk
of not being sustained on the merits was great because in fact the
taxpayer's was not sustained on the merits. The preparer cannot be
faulted so long as the risk was not apparent at the time the return
was prepared and the position was taken.
C.

The Tort Law Malpractice Standard

The standard of care exacted from lawyers and accountants under
tort law is not measured by the ordinary reasonable person standard
of tort law. Instead, courts employ the more stringent reasonable
lawyer or reasonable accountant standard, which is defined by the
daily work of actual practitioners.3 In malpractice cases, expert testimony is ordinarily presented from witnesses who are familiar with
the practices of lawyers or accountants and can testify to whether the
defendant-tax-professional's performance departed from that of ordinarily competent practitioners3 9 Definition of the applicable standard
of care has largely been a process of comparing the defendant's performance with the performance of other tax professionals in similar
40
situations.

37.

See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 5.

38.

CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

§ 5.6.2, at 211 (1986).

39. Id.
40. See id. at 212.
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Clients reasonably expect that the lawyer's training and skill make
the lawyer a valuable source of information about probable outcomes
in the legal system. However, "[a] lawyer can act unreasonably in
assessing the future just as well as a lawyer can act unreasonably in
failing to file a client's claim within the statute of limitations.' ' 41 On
the other hand, a lawyer should not be required to guess about what
the law is, and if the state of the law is uncertain, the lawyer's
informed judgment about the probable resolution of relevant legal
propositions should not be the basis for a claim of malpractice. In the
final analysis, the question is one of degree - was the advice or other
lawyer's conduct reasonable under the circumstances. 42 In general,
lawyers and tax professionals are not permitted to produce legal uncertainty themselves by failing to conduct reasonable research. If the
tax professional conducts research or the professional is otherwise
reasonably aware of the state of the law, the tax professional's advice
in light of an uncertain state of the law will normally fully comply
with the reasonable-practitioner standard.Insofar as the realistic possibility of success standard implies some
forecast of results, it does so by focusing on the manner in which the
forecast of the outcome is made. The question is whether the lawyer
or accountant acted reasonably in saying, in effect, that the return
position is defensible or warranted in law.
D.

Unjustifiable Litigating Positions

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the following:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing Law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
4
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 4

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 215.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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The same kind of obligation is imposed by the Tax Court's rules.45
Sanctions are also imposed for failure to obey a pretrial scheduling
order, 46 for discovery abuse, 47 and for frivolous appeals.48 An attorney
49
can be held in contempt for any of these improper acts.
Rule 11 sets a standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign
pleadings and motions. It emphasizes the responsibilities of the attorney and reinforces those obligations by the imposition of sanctions.
The similarity to section 6694 of the Code is striking. Rule 11 imposes
a sanction that can include a monetary penalty, ° and section 6694
imposes a penalty of $250.51 As indicated above, both Rule 11 and the
return preparer penalty require some support in fact and law.52
To satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by Rule 11, an attorney
must make a pre-filing inquiry into both the facts and the law of the
case.0 The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances,5 and those circumstances include whether the pleading,
motion, or other paper was based on "a plausible view of the law."'
In general, most courts have held that the standard imposed on
lawyers by Rule 11 is an objective one and that subjective bad faith
need not be shown. 6 Even so, Rule 11 is not intended to chill a
lawyer's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,
and the court is expected to avoid using hindsight in applying the
Rule. 57 The complexity of the law, the non-frivolous argument of the
lawyer, and whether the claim is colorable are all considered in determining whether sanctions are appropriate. 8
Rule 11 as originally adopted seemed to restate several of the
Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the ABA. For example,
Canon 30 was captioned "Justifiable and Unjustifiable Litigation," and
stated that:

45.

TAx COURT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 33(b).

46.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
FED. R. App. P. 38.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f); 37(b)(1).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

"

I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1991).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11; I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (1991).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

55.
56.

JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11, at 121 (2d ed. 1991).
Id.
Id. § 11.4, at 129.

57.

Id. § 11.2, at 121.

58.

Id.
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The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make
a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass
or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or
wrong . . . . His appearance in court should be deemed
equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion
his client's case is one proper for judicial determination. 59
Similarly, Canon 31, entitled "Responsibility for Litigation," provided that: "The responsibility for advising as to questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging questionable defenses,
is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by urging as an
excuse that he is only following his client's instructions."' 60 Accordingly,
under the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer was responsible for decisions taken in litigation and was required to have some
justification for a claim before urging it on behalf of a client.6 '
The Canons of Professional Ethics were eventually replaced by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA
in August, 1983.62 Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules, entitled "Meritorious
Claims and Contentions," provides the following: "A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. '63 Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules thus incorporates the
language of Rule 11. A lawyer must take responsibility for ensuring
that the client's position in any proceeding is non-frivolous and that
it is warranted either in existing law or in a good faith extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
How does the Rule 11 standard help in analyzing the realistic
possibility standard? Rule 11 requires the lawyer to investigate both
the facts and the law to have a basis for a client's position in a proceeding,6 4 and the position must be non-frivolous.- Because a realistic
position based on fact is a real world possibility, and also is non-frivolous, in this respect at least, the Rule 11 standard and the preparer

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 30 (1980).
60. Id. Canon 31.
61. See id.
62. It is noteworthy that Rule 11 was also amended in 1983 and that both the Model Rule
and Rule 11 use the same terminology. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
63. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
65. Id.

59.
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penalty standard are identical. A position that is not supported by
existing law is not sanctionable so long as the position is for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and is made in good
faith after a reasonable inquiry, as objectively judged. 66 A position
that has no realistic possibility of extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law would be sanctionable under Rule 11. It would also be
subject to penalty under section 6694.67
But more may be required under section 6694 than is required
under Rule 11. When a lawyer takes a position in a proceeding, that
position usually is disclosed in a pleading or another filing in the
proceeding, such as a motion or a brief. Pretrial proceedings are designed to disclose the positions of the parties before trial and to avoid
surprise at trial. Procedures for the disclosure of positions simply do
not exist when a position is taken on a tax return, and a disclosure
statement is not fied with the return. It would follow from Rule 11,
therefore, that a tax return position based on a good faith argument
for the extension of existing law need not be disclosed, but that a
position calling for a modification or reversal of existing law must be
disclosed.
Apart from these observations, however, it can be seen that the
Rule 11 standard, so similar to the realistic possibility standard in its
operation, is a standard of conduct, not of consequences. The standard
also is not violated simply because the court rejects the lawyer's position, so long as the lawyer has a basis for the position and has acted
with reasonable care or due diligence (objective considerations) in
investigating the facts and the law.6
E.

ABA Opinion 85-352 and AICPA SRTP No. 1

A little history is necessary to understand the realistic possibility
of success standard as it was adopted by the ABA and later the
AICPA. Radically abbreviated, the history may be summarized as
follows. From 1965 to 1985, ABA Opinion 314 described a lawyer's
professional obligation in advising a client in the course of preparing
a tax return: "a lawyer who is asked to advise his client in the course
of the preparation of the client's tax returns may freely urge the
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long as
there is reasonable basis for those positions. '' 69 ABA Opinion 314's

66.
67.
68.
69.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 & advisory committee notes.
See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1991).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
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"reasonable basis" standard was coupled with a statement that the
Service is "not designed and does not purport to be unprejudiced and
unbiased in the judicial sense. 70° This implied that the Service is an
adversary in litigation and in negotiations for the settlement of a tax
case. In this process, the lawyer owes a duty of candor, may not be
associated with perjury, fraud, and deception and is, under certain
71
circumstances, required to withdraw from the matter.
A lawyer who had a "reasonable basis" for a return position presumably had acted after reasonable research. In this sense, the reasonable
basis standard was in the mainstream of negligence and malpractice
law where the reasonable person and the reasonably competent practitioner are the standard conduct. In other words, the basis for a
return position would not be reasonable unless it were considered so
by a reasonably competent tax practitioner.
If the reasonable basis standard seems so traditional, how did the
standard come to represent a cynical cover for shoddy, if not disreputable, tax advice? The answer is the bogey-man of the 1970s: investments of individual taxpayers, primarily in tax shelters. What made
the tax return positions of individual taxpayers flowing from tax shelters so troublesome to the Service was the likelihood that such return
positions would go undetected since the Service was examining fewer
and fewer individual tax returns.7 2 Not only were taxpayers taking
what were believed to be aggressive return positions, they and their
advisers were suspected of taking advantage of the reality that the
taxpayer had less than a three percent chance of being examined.In a 1980 speech, the then General Counsel of the Treasury warned
that the Treasury Department was concerned that lawyers' opinions
were being used in tax shelter promotions as selling points and penalty
insurance for taxpayers.7 4 One of the troublesome tax opinions described in the speech was the "reasonable basis but you'll probably
lose" opinion.- These opinions (which are also lengthy) point out that
there is a reasonable basis for the claimed tax benefits, but warns
the taxpayer that if he is audited, his claims would be challenged and

70.

Id.

71.

See id. (discussing

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Canons 29, 37,

41 & 44).
72. See, e.g., H. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1982).
73. Robert H. Mundheim, Remarks on Standards for Tax Attorneys, DAILY TAX REP.,
Jan. 22, 1980, at J-1, reprinted in BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 175-80 (2d ed. 1985).
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id.
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that under existing law he would probably lose. 76 Following this
speech, Treasury proposed amendments to Treasury Circular 230 that
generally imposed due diligence requirements on tax practitioners as
to the facts disclosed, the issues addressed in the tax opinion, and
the probability that the principal tax benefits would be allowed.7 This
same due diligence standard was adopted by the ABA in Formal
Opinion 346.78 Under this standard, the lawyer is obligated not only
to investigate the underlying facts to insure their accuracy and completeness, but to relate the law to the actual facts (and to identify
any facts assumed). 79
The Service was moving on another front to deal with the "audit
lottery." In response to this problem, then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Kurtz urged that taxpayers and their preparers
should be required to report on their returns "questionable"
positions that have been taken on the return (that is, positions that are) knowingly inconsistent with published regulations, rulings or cases. The kind of position that accountants
reserve against - the kind of position lawyers would call
to the attention of investors in a public offering.8
In 1982, this view bore fruit in the enactment of the substantial
understatement penalty.81 The substantial understatement penalty was
imposed if the taxpayer lacked "substantial authority" for a position
and the position caused a substantial understatement of tax. 82 However, a taxpayer lacking substantial authority could also avoid the
penalty by disclosing the return position 3 The legislative history of
the substantial understatement penalty adopted the view that the
authorities relevant to a tax return position included Service administrative pronouncements such as revenue rulings, as well as Code pro-

76.

Id.

77.
78.
79.
80.

45 Fed. Reg. 58,594 (1980).
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
Id.
Jerome Kurtz, Remarks to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,

DAILY TAx REP., May 26, 1977, at J-3, reprinted in WOLFMiAN & HOLDEN, supra note 73,

at 60.
81.
ponent
82.
83.

Former I.R.C. § 6661 (1982) (repealed in 1989 but simultaneously reenacted as a comof § 6662, the accuracy related penalty).
Former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(i) (1982).
Former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982).
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visions, court opinions, Treasury regulations, and committee reports
reflecting congressional intent.
Courts were supposed to be free to interpret substantial authority
in accordance with the legislative purpose of the penalty and not
punish taxpayers who made a good faith effort to self-assess tax.- In
this spirit, substantial authority existed for a return position even if
it would probably not be successful in court so long as it had a substantial, rather than merely a "reasonable" basis.8 6 According to the legislative history,
a taxpayer is required to have more support for his position
than it is arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in Court
upon a complete review of the relevant facts and authorities.
Rather, when the relevant facts and authorities are analyzed
with respect to the taxpayer's case, the weight of the authorities that support the taxpayer's position should be substantial when compared with those supporting other positions., 7
In short, to avoid a substantial understatement penalty in the event
of a deficiency, the taxpa-yer was required to have substantial authority
for the return position -- that is, authority that was at least as likely
to be accepted by a court as to be rejected. Provided the authority
was "substantial" and not. merely "reasonable," acceptance by the court
need not have been probable.
Although the substantial authority standard was (and still is) ambiguous, the legislative rejection of the reasonable basis standard was
clear enough.- Taxpayers willing to play the audit lottery were seen
to have been aided by tax advisers who believed that there was a
"reasonable basis" for the return position. s9 As a 1984 proposed revision
of ABA Opinion 314 stated: "The 'reasonable basis' standard of practice
promulgated in Formal Opinion 314 has been the subject of misinterpretation and misapplication, to the extent that it has been con-

84. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions
of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 217-18.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. (stating that the new standard requires a taxpayer to have stronger support
for a position than a mere "reasonable basis").
89. Id.
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strued to support the use of any colorable claim to justify exploitation
of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process." 9
The proposed revision of ABA Opinion 314 required that the return
position be a "meritorious one," which meant a position "advanced in
good faith, as evidenced by a practical and realistic possibility of success." 91 In addition, the lawyer must have honestly entertained the
belief that the position may well "be held to be correct, either on the
merits of existing authority or by reversal of existing authority." 92
What this historical summary shows is that the reasonable basis
standard did not change during the 1970s. Return positions reporting
deductions or credits from a tax sheltered investment were not necessarily reasonable under the reasonable basis standard. In short, the
reasonable basis standard did not make indefensible return positions
reasonable. But the prevailing belief, especially in the Treasury and
Service, was that lawyers and other tax practitioners were advising
clients that they could take return positions even when those positions
were unlikely, at least in the Service's view, to prevail in court. 93
In 1985, the ABA adopted as a standard of return preparation the
realistic possibility of success standard to replace the reasonable basis
standard.4 It did so not because it accepted the criticism of the reasonable basis standard, but because it believed it necessary to restate
the existing standard so as to avoid its misapplication in practice.
Thus, ABA Opinion 85-352 did not disavow the reasonable basis standard, 95 nor did it claim that the realistic possibility standard was a
higher standard than the reasonable basis standard. 96 To restate the
standard, however, ABA Opinion 85-352 borrowed concepts underlying
Rule 11 and the ethical standards applicable to lawyers in other proceedings:
In summary, a lawyer may advise reporting a position on a
return even where the lawyer believes the position probably
will not prevail, there is no "substantial authority" in support
of the position, and there will be no disclosure of the position
in the return. However, the position to be asserted must be

90. ABA Section of Taxation Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314, May 21, 1984,
reprintedin WOLFMAN & HOLDEN, supra note 73, at 71.
91. Id. at 73.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz, PenaltyRevision and the Casefor Section 6661, 42 TAx NOTES
(TAx ANALYSTS) 1617 (1989).
94. ABA Opinion 85-352, supra note 6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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one which the lawyer in good faith believes is warranted in
existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
This requires that there is some realistic possibility of success
if the matter is litigated.9The "warranted in existing law" language and the test itself are derived directly from Rule 11.
While the ABA modified the conduct standard from "reasonable
basis" to "realistic possibility of success," the AICPA initially retained
the "reasonable basis" standard set forth in its Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 10 (1977).29 In apparent response to the
lack of uniformity in the professional organization standards, amendments to section 10.34 of Treasury Circular 230 were proposed on
August 14, 1986, and were published in the Federal Register on August 14, 1986.9 In general, these proposed amendments provided that
the statutory requirements of the substantial tax understatement penalty of section 6661 provided guidance on the exercise of due diligence,100 and that accordingly, a practitioner was prohibited from recommending or advising a taxpayer to adopt a return position if the
return position might subject the taxpayer to a penalty for a substantial understatement of tax.101 For example, in a non-tax-shelter situation, the proposed requirement would not be met unless there was
"substantial authority" for the position or, in its absence, the position
had been adequately disclosed. These proposed amendments were
never adopted,10 2 but in 1988, the AICPA followed the ABA Tax
Section and adopted the realistic possibility of success standard for
return preparation.103
Shortly thereafter, both the AICPA and the ABA Tax Section
recommended the adoption of a uniform standard for tax return positions as follows:

97. Id.
98. TAX RETURN POSITIONS, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 10 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1977).
99. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113-15 (1986).
100. Id. at 29,113-14.
101. Id. at 29,114.
102. Both the AICPA and ABA Tax Section submitted comments opposing adoption of the
proposed standard (AICPA Letter, dated Feb. 13, 1987, from Herbert Lerner and Leonard
Podolin and ABA Tax Section Letter, dated Feb. 12, 1987, from John B. Jones, Jr.).
103. TAX RETURN POSITIONS, supra note 6.
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A practitioner may not advise or recommend to a client that
a position be taken with respect to the tax treatment of any
item or a return unless the practitioner has a good faith
belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being
sustained administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged.1M
Nevertheless under this standard,
the practitioner may advise or recommend that a position
be presented in the context of either: (1) a return on which
a position is adequately disclosed, or (2) an amended return
that serves as a claim for refund (e.g., a Form 1040X or
1120X), in either case so long as the practitioner concludes
05
that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.1
From this history, it is clear that ABA Opinion 85-352 adopted the
same standard of conduct for the preparation of tax returns that
applied to lawyers under Rule 11 when they take positions for clients
in proceedings. Both Rule 11 and the ethical standard require no more
than due diligence and reasonable investigation before taking a posiA
tion.
Consequently, if, as the House Report states,1 the ethical standard
of the ABA and the AICPA was adopted by section 6694, a realistic
possibility of success standard requires the same conduct on the part
of return preparers as is required under the professional group standards. Interpreting the realistic possibility of success standard in light
of Rule 11 means that a return preparer has a duty to make a legal
and factual inquiry to ensure that the return position is warranted in
existing law. It also requires an inquiry to make certain that the
position is not taken for some improper purpose, such as exploiting
the likelihood that the return will not be audited by the Service. The
standard does not require calculation of the chances of success. It does
require reasonable investigation of both the facts and the applicable
law before taking a position that is not sustained on the merits.
F.

The Realistic Possibility Standard Reinterpreted Summary of Analysis

With this background, we can summarize what is required by a
realistic possibility standard. If a return preparer has (1) made a good

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 5, at 1396.
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faith attempt to determine the correct return position (due diligence),
(2) found at least some support for the position (reasonable support),
and (3) after reasonably competent research, found no contrary authority demonstrating that a court could not practically (i.e., realistically)
be expected to sustain the position, then the preparer will have satisfied the realistic possibility standard. The statement in the regulations
that the standard means "a one in three, or greater, likelihood of
being sustained on its merits,11 7 is inconsistent with the background
of the ABA standard, which section 6694 incorporates, and, which, in
turn, was derived from the Model Code and Rule 11.
The realistic possibility of success standard is a standard of conduct,
not of speculation about, or correct prediction of, the chances that the
position can be successfully defended. Rule 11 does not require a
lawyer to calculate the chances of winning on a litigating position.
Practically speaking, that sort of calculation is not possible. It is true
that some reasonable assessment of the likelihood of success may be
required of professionals, but this assessment is simply the kind of
service a professional is reasonably expected to provide so that a client
is not committed to frivolous litigation. Thus, although some forecasting of results can be expected by professionals, the question under
the realistic possibility standard should be whether the preparer acted
reasonably in saying that the return position is defensible in fact and
warranted in law.
G.

Relevance of the SubstantialAuthority Analysis to the Realistic
Possibility Analysis

Regulations interpreting section 6694 provide that "[tihe analysis
prescribed under [the substantial authority regulations] for purposes
of determining whether substantial authority is present applies for
purposes of determining whether the realistic possibility standard is
satisfied. ' 10 8 But is it appropriate to use a taxpayer penalty analysis
to describe the preparer's analysis of a realistic possibility of success?
As we shall see, in some respects, the analysis of substantial authority
is no different from the due diligence expected of the preparer. In
other ways, however, by requiring preparers to meet a substantial
authority standard, the regulations confuse the process, and seem not
to have followed the intention of Congress.
It is fairly obvious that, in performing a due diligence search for
legal support for a return position, a preparer will look for, and hope

107.
108.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1991).
Id.
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to find, authority to support that position. Finding commonly accepted
authorities, the preparer will weigh them. The process is virtually the
same for both the AICPA and the penalty regulations interpreting
"substantial authority." The AICPA's interpretation of the realistic
possibility standard set forth in its Statement on Responsibilities in
Tax Practice No. 1 describes the process this way:
The CPA should consider the weight of each authority in
order to conclude whether a position meets the realistic possibility standard. In determining the weight of an authority,
the CPA should consider its persuasiveness, relevance, and
source. Thus, the type of authority is a significant factor.
Other important factors include whether the facts stated in
the authority are distinguishable from those of the client and
whether the authority contains an analysis of the issue or
merely states a conclusion. 1°9
The substantial authority regulations contain language that is quite
similar to the language used by the AICPA:
The weight of authorities is determined in light of the pertinent facts and circumstances in the manner described
[below]. ...
The weight accorded an authority depends on its relevance and persuasiveness, and the type of document providing the authority. For example, a case or revenue ruling
having some facts in common with the tax treatment at issue
is not particularly relevant if the authority is materially distinguishable on its facts, or is otherwise inapplicable to the
tax treatment at issue. An authority that merely states a
conclusion ordinarily is less persuasive than one that reaches
its conclusion by cogently relating the applicable law to pertinent facts ....
There may be substantial authority forothe
tax treatment of an item despite the absence of certain types
of authority. Thus, a taxpayer may have substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned
construction of the applicable statutory provision. 110
Thus, the research processes described in the professional group standard and under the substantial authority regulations are the same. But,
the standards do not quite require the same kind of analysis.

109.
110.

SRTP Interpretation No. 1-1.09 (1990).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (1991).
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It is worth noting that when Congress was considering changes to
the preparer penalty, one of the recommendations was that the substantial authority standard be used.-" Instead of the substantial authority standard, however, the realistic possibility of success standard
used by professional organizations was chosen. This suggests that
Congress chose not to incorporate the substantial authority standard
into a preparer's analysis. At any rate, by incorporating the "substantial authority" analysis, the regulations add elements of uncertainty
as well as controversy to a preparer's attempt to determine whether
the realistic possibility of success standard is satisfied.
The uncertainty and controversy exist because the AICPA does
not consider the realistic possibility of success standard and substantial
authority standard to be the same standard. The AICPA considers
the realistic possibility of success standard to be less stringent than
the substantial authority. 112 Using the Service's view that a realistic
possibility of success is a one in three chance of success, this could
mean that substantial authority is something less than a probability
(more than 50%) and something more than a realistic possibility (33%).
This percentage view of the standards assumes a quantitative
analysis, and it is not at all certain that a quantitative analysis is
appropriate for the realistic possibility of success standard. As discussed above, the realistic possibility of success standard properly
understood is a qualitative standard. It does not require a professional
to calculate the odds of success with precision. Rather, it is directed
at measuring the conduct and the result of reasonably competent research against the conduct of the reasonable return preparer. By contrast, the substantial authority regulations imply a quantitative
analysis insofar as they provide that a return position that is "arguable,
but fairly unlikely to prevail in court," does not satisfy the substantial
authority standard.1 3 Quantitative judgment is also implied by the
statement that substantial authority is something less than a probabil14
ity and more than a reasonable basis.1
A quantitative approach to the realistic possibility of success standard
not only is inconsistent with its origin, it is also impractical to achieve.
Unless the facts pertaining to the return issue are certain, any quantitative calculation of the chances of success will be a guess. As Judge
Jerome Frank pointed out in Courts on Trial,15 a prediction of the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Civil Penalty Hearings II, supra note 2, at 37-38.
SRTP Interpretation No. 1.06 (1990).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991).
Id.
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
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outcome of a contest before a trial and a decision will be so full of
"ifs" as to be of little practical value. Consider the uncertainties of
witness credibility, the bias or prejudice of the finder of facts, and
other factors in the trial of a case. Even after a trial and before a
decision, guessing at the result is difficult. Only after a trial and a
decision settling what the facts of the case are, can a competent and
trained lawyer predict the result with accuracy (and even then not
always) because the only question is the legal rule the appellate court
will apply to the facts as already found.
Seen against this description of what lawyers can actually predict,
the use of a one in three chance of success requirement to define the
realistic possibility of success standard is more of a metaphor than a
useful guide. To the extent that "substantial authority" purports to
carryover a quantitative analysis to the preparer's analysis, therefore,
it collides with the professional interpretation of the realistic possibility
of success standard.
It thus appears that while "substantial authority" has some relevance to the realistic possibility of success standard, the weighing
process but not the analysis is the same. It must have seemed that
incorporating the substantial authority analysis into the preparer
analysis achieved some goal of simplicity. But the approach is more
likely to cause confusion and uncertainty for preparers and the courts.
There is another respect in which the AICPA's interpretation of
the realistic possibility of success standard differs from the substantial
authority regulations. The AICPA interpretation of the realistic possibility of success standard permits a wider range of authorities to be
considered than do the regulations governing the substantial authority
and realistic possibility of success standards. The AICPA's interpretation permits CPAs to "rely on well-reasoned treatises, articles in recognized professional tax publications, and other reference tools and
sources of tax analyses commonly used by tax advisors and return
preparers.116 The substantial authority regulations contain a list of
acceptable authorities, which explicitly excludes such commonly used
.sources as treatises and articles.1 7 Also, the AICPA permits reliance
on private letter rulings and general counsel memoranda more than
ten years old. 18 The substantial authority regulations provide that
such documents are entitled to very little weight. 119 This broader range

116.
117.
118.
119.

SRTP
Treas.
SRTP
Treas.

Interpretation No. 1-1.07 (1990).
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991).
Interpretation No. 1-1.07 (1990).
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1991).
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of permitted authorities shows that the AICPA's criterion is whether
the tools and sources are those commonly used by tax professionals.
Consequently, the substantial authority regulations are contrary to
the very professional standard the penalty statute incorporated.
The preparer should be able to consult any source so long as it is
one that a reasonable preparer would rely on in practice, not only
those authorities that are considered in a "substantial authority"
analysis for purposes of the substantial understatement accuracy-related penalty context. For this reason, a date limitation on authoritative rulings, for example, is unacceptable because such a limitation
fails to credit the normative nature of the realistic possibility of success
standard. Consequently, by coordinating substantial authority and the
realistic possibility analysis, the Regulations have created differences
between the realistic possibility of success standard, as interpreted in
the Regulations, and the realistic possibility of success standard as
interpreted by the AICPA.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Service's attempt to focus on the odds of success creates a
standard contrary to common practice. Neither attorneys nor accountants can or should be asked to prognosticate how a court or the Service
will decide an issue. In practical terms, the Service's focus on the
odds of success would limit the standard to issues of law, not of fact.
Only in areas where the facts are clear can results begin to be predictable. In addition, limiting the scope of acceptable authorities could
lead to a situation where a practitioner has acted professionally under
the realistic possibility of success standard, as interpreted by the
AICPA, but is subject to penalty under the same standard, as interpreted by the Service. Obviously, if this can occur, section 6694 cannot
be said to have adopted the standard of return preparation utilized
by professional groups, as Congress intended.
In the end, general statements do not resolve the specific situations
facing return preparers. In most cases, there is either clear support
for a position or clear authority against it. For those cases in the
middle ground, the return preparer must engage in research and
analysis to develop a position before the return is filed. In this middle
ground, the realistic possibility of success standard requires a preparer
to make a reasonable inquiry of the facts and to conduct reasonable
research of the applicable law to determine whether there is support
for the return position that stands a practical chance of being accepted
in an administrative or judicial proceeding. The tax return preparer
is obligated to do no less, but the preparer certainly is obligated to
do no more.
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